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Abstract  
This paper constructs an innovative approach to measure school district organizational effectiveness. 
We use the fully nonparametric Benefit-of-the-Doubt approach to construct a composite indicator which 
reduces subjectivity in choosing weights attached to different functions of school districts. The model 
is extended to reduce the influence of outliers (robust) and to account for the exogenous environment 
(conditional). We apply the suggested technique to unique and self-collected data from surveys and 
interviews taken from school board members and principals. We illustrate why accounting for 
respondent characteristics is crucial when evaluating school districts. Next, we analyze the obtained 
aggregate measures to identify which organizational structures, board characteristics and management 
styles are of importance for the organizational effectiveness of school districts. 
Keywords: Education; School district organizational effectiveness; Economics of education; Empirical 
management.  
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1. Introduction 
The New Public Management theories have created a growing tendency to improve effectiveness in 
public agencies and have stressed the importance of professionalism and optimization (Alonso, Clifton, 
& Díaz-Fuentes, 2015). Since its introduction in the 1980s, hospitals, nursing homes and other 
government-owned agencies have been transformed into more ‘market-friendly’ organizations. More 
recently, this observed trend is spreading towards education, both at the school and the school district 
level (Jarl, Fredriksson, & Persson, 2012). School districts are in charge of supervising schools, ranging 
from only one school to vast networks of schools. Their organization depends on the educational system. 
For example, in the US, school districts operate in a dedicated geographical area, while in many 
European countries school districts are not bound by catchment areas. Figure 1 displays the general 
hierarchical relationship between schools and the district. Schools are led by a school principal, while 
school districts are run by the school board.1  
Topics on organizational effectiveness have been extensively discussed at the school level (Ball, 
2011; Bessent & Bessent, 1980; Di Liberto, Schivardi, & Sulis, 2015), while the study of organizational 
effectiveness is largely ignored at the school district level. Nevertheless, the latter is argued to play a 
major role in the management of schools because school districts determine the schools' mission and 
goals, and the selection and support of the school leader (Jackson, 2003). Student achievement has also 
been linked to the degree of organizational effectiveness in a school district (Bidwell & Kasarda, 1975; 
Ford & Ihrke, 2016). Using a transition probability model, Gritz and Theobald (1996) have found a 
relationship between organizational decisions (e.g. spending priorities) and length of stay in teaching by 
teachers. Unnever, Kerckhoff and Robinson (2000) identified a significant link between educational 
resources at the district level and student outcomes, stressing the importance of an adequate financial 
policy, one of the functions of a school district. The organizational effectiveness of school districts has 
also been linked to financial outcomes (Saatcioglu et al., 2011). Using data from 1800 high schools in 8 
countries, Bloom et al. (2015) identified principal leadership and having strong accountability to an 
external governing body as major drivers of school-level variance in management quality. As this 
governing body is the school board at the district level, their results indicated a decisive role for school 
districts.  
Organizational effectiveness in education is commonly measured as a single-item scale where 
respondents indicate their overall satisfaction with the school district (Bradshaw, Murray, & Wolpin, 
1992). As opposed to a single question trying to capture the complex concept of organizational 
effectiveness, some studies have constructed a multi-item scale encompassing all district functions (e.g. 
Bloom et al., 2015). Most commonly, all components of a multi-item scale are averaged in order to 
obtain a composite indicator of organizational effectiveness. An important limitation of this approach is 
                                                     
1 Throughout this text, we use the term ‘school board’ and ‘school district’ interchangeably.  
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that all dimensions have the same weights such that this outcome variable does not grant freedom to 
school districts to differ in their priorities. Some school districts might find one dimension more 
important than others such that assuming fixed weights for all districts does not grasp the heterogeneity 
in education. Moreover, in the absence of a consensus on the relative importance of the components, 
any choice of fixed weights will be subjective to some extent. Fixed weights may favor school districts 
who perform well on aspects with high weights, while disfavoring districts who excel on aspects with 
low assigned weights. As a final limitation, it is unclear for school districts what the scores imply as 
they are not constructed in a relative perspective to other school districts.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we construct an innovative empirical 
measure of school district organizational effectiveness that summarizes all district functions into one 
composite indicator. Our approach is robust for outlying observations (or measurement error) and fully 
nonparametric. As a result, no a priori assumptions on the functional form (i.e. weighting the different 
functions) are required. In addition, the indicator is a relative measure that is easy to interpret and allows 
school districts sufficient leeway in setting their priorities. That is, school districts are compared to a 
frontier composed of the most effective districts. This frontier is constructed in a way that environmental 
factors, outside the influence of school districts, are taken into account in order to only benchmark school 
districts relative to districts operating in largely similar environments. This can be argued to be of major 
importance when operating environments (e.g. socio-economic composition of school districts) cannot 
be changed by the evaluated unit. Imposing the assumption that the environment can be controlled will 
result in an unfair comparison of units with frontier points outside their attainable set. In this paper, we 
use survey data and illustrate the importance of conditioning on respondent characteristics. Our measure 
of organizational effectiveness can be seen as ‘perceived’ effectiveness. Hence, the perceived frontier 
might be different depending on the evaluator. Evaluated units cannot change who is evaluating their 
effectiveness and hence, respondent characteristics can be considered exogenous. Applying the 
separability test of Daraio, Simar, & Wilson (2017), we formally reject the assumption that the 
evaluation does not depend on respondent characteristics (i.e. separability). Including differences in 
perceptions can be considered a requirement when using survey data. Therefore, we tailor the BoD 
Figure 1: Organizational structure in education systems. 
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approach to a robust, conditional measure of organizational effectiveness of school districts. We further 
extend this approach, following Li, Simar, & Zelenyuk (2016), by estimating bandwidths for continuous 
variables (school district environment) separately for unique combinations of discrete variables 
(respondent characteristics), in order to obtain conditional measures. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this methodology has not been previously applied to measure the organizational 
effectiveness of school districts. Note that when evaluating organizational effectiveness of other entities, 
this approach can also be useful, especially when using survey data.2 
As a second contribution, we analyze the obtained aggregate measures to identify which 
organizational structures, board characteristics and management styles are of importance for the 
organizational effectiveness of school districts. To increase internal consistency, we use the same 
analytical framework, following Daraio & Simar (2005), avoiding the need to impose separability 
(Daraio et al., 2017; Simar & Wilson, 2007). In order to illustrate the usefulness of our approach, we 
apply the method to a detailed and self-collected dataset for school districts in Flanders. Our results 
indicate that school districts adhering to a participative management style and districts with more 
experienced board members outperform other districts in terms of organizational effectiveness. Also, 
private school districts achieve significantly higher levels of organizational effectiveness, along with 
larger districts and consolidated rather than cooperating districts. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In the following section we provide an overview of the available 
literature and in so doing, motivate the need for an empirical, quantitative approach towards measuring 
and explaining organizational effectiveness at the school district level. Section 3 introduces the 
methodology. Next, we present the setting and data. In section 5 we present the results and explain the 
observed variance in organizational effectiveness. Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes. 
2. Literature and background 
As outlined in the introduction, many leading papers have pointed towards school districts as 
determinants of high performing schools. However, school districts as the unit of analysis received little 
attention. A common approach in existing studies is to estimate education production functions or cost 
functions and include school district characteristics, such as district size.3 Some papers have studied 
school district organization from a political economy point of view, by focusing on labor unions and 
teacher wages (e.g. Rose & Sonstelie, 2010). However, most papers are situated in the educational or 
pedagogical literature. Hence, evidence from these studies on organizational effectiveness of school 
districts is almost entirely based on case-studies as a method to define best practices. The most 
prominent example is known as the ‘Lighthouse Study’, conducted by the Iowa Association of School 
Boards (Delagardelle, 2008). Organizational effectiveness was measured by the adherence to ‘seven 
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3 School district size has been studied extensively (Andrews, Duncombe, & Yinger, 2002; Leach, Payne, & Chan, 2010). 
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conditions for productive change’, put forward by Gemberling, Smith, & Villani (2000). Following this 
report, high-achieving school districts are those districts more likely to perform well on the subsequent 
set of conditions: Vision, Standards, Assessment, Accountability, Climate and Culture, Collaboration 
and Community Engagement, and Continuous Improvement. A more comprehensive description of 
these concepts can be found in Gemberling et al. (2000). A measure of the ‘degree of adherence’ was 
constructed by interviewing board members and school staff. This approach is similar to a study by Ford 
and Ihrke (2016), who identified a relationship between district-level outcomes and adherence to a set 
of best practices. Johnson (2012) proposes another set of 12 key practices, based on a review of the 
literature. There are only few quantitative studies focusing on the school district level4, including 
Hoffman (1995), who investigates a sample of 133 school boards. He defines effective school boards 
(districts) as “school boards that involve school team and parents (committee) in their decision making 
process”. (Hoffman, 1995, p. 308). This finding indicates the importance of a bottom-up approach in 
managing school districts. With respect to the Flemish educational setting, earlier work on the 
organization of school districts is marked by several limitations (Caenepeel, 1988; Devos, 2008). They 
are rather dated and are incomplete because of the non-proportional sampling of the different school 
districts in relation to their education providers (community, official subsidized, grant aided) and their 
diversity (number of pupils, types of education etc.). Moreover, their analysis has a low power, such 
that it is difficult to draw strong and general conclusions out of them. 
The current literature on the organizational effectiveness of school districts has also been criticized. 
Usdan et al. (2001) argue that studies proposing sets of best practices should be interpreted with caution 
since “best practices are case-and country specific” (Usdan et al., 2001). Johnson (2012, p. 89) argues 
that research on the organizational effectiveness of school districts is “saturated with many opinion-
based articles“. Similar statements have been made by Alsbury (2008) and Delagardelle (2008). Land 
(2002) observed that the available literature is “rife with conclusions and recommendations based on 
personal experience, observations and opinions and a heavy reliance on anecdotal evidence rather than 
on well-designed research studies” (p. 265).  
To summarize, only few studies investigate what constitutes a good school district, or how a school 
district should be organized. To the best of our knowledge, there is no well-established evaluation 
methodology to compare the effectiveness of school districts that have multiple tasks and are operating 
in a heterogeneous environment. Therefore, we provide a framework to benchmark school districts and 
obtain a measure of organizational effectiveness. 
                                                     
4 This in contrast with the abundant quantitative literature on school management practices (e.g. Ball, 2011; Bloom et al., 2015, 
Di Liberto et al., 2015). However, this level of organization is not the focus of our paper. Nevertheless, we will include variables 
at the school level to control for the heterogeneity between schools when we assess the drivers of school district organizational 
effectiveness in section 5. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. ‘Benefit-of-the-Doubt’ (BoD) 
To estimate the multidimensional measure of school district organizational effectiveness, we use a 
nonparametric model, rooted in data envelopment analysis (DEA). Our methodology follows the 
‘Benefit-of-the-Doubt’ model (BoD), as an extension of DEA, originally developed by Farrell (1957) 
and put into practice by Charnes et al. (1978).5 Formally, all inputs are assumed to be equal to 1 for all 
evaluated school districts. However, this idea is not new. It was originally proposed by Thompson et al. 
(1986), and Adolphson, Cornia, & Walters (1991), coined the term ‘Benefit-of-the-Doubt’ by Melyn & 
Moesen (1991) who applied the method to obtain an indicator of macroeconomic performance, and 
subsequently formalized under a DEA framework by Lovell and Pastor (1999). In 2008, this approach 
was suggested by the OECD as a method to construct composite indicators (OECD, 2008), spurring 
many applications in different fields: among others, in bibliometrics (García-Romero, Santín, & Sicilia, 
2016), health care (Shwartz, Burgess, & Zhu, 2016), competitiveness (Li & Zhao, 2015), police 
effectiveness (Verschelde & Rogge, 2012), and energy (Zanella, Camanho, & Dias, 2015). 
In our application, outputs consist of four school district functions. The weights, u, attached to the 
different functions, y (1,…, r,…,s) are endogenously determined by the model such that this set of 
weights is not subject to ex ante assumptions.6 In other words, the weights for the evaluated school 
district o are chosen in such a way to maximize its relative strengths: max ∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑜
𝑠
𝑟=1 . By applying this 
model, each school district is granted the ‘benefit of the doubt’ in determining the relative importance 
of each district function. The BoD model described above can be translated into the following notation 
(Cherchye, Moesen, Rogge, & Puyenbroeck, 2007): 
    max
𝑢
𝜃𝑜 (𝑦) = ∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑜
𝑠
𝑟=1    (1) 
    𝑠. 𝑡.  
    ∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗 ≤ 1 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛)
𝑠
𝑟=1    (1a) 
    𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑠 ≥ 0    (1b) 
    ∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑠
𝑟=1 = 1    (1c) 
With n the number of evaluated school districts, s the number of outputs y, weighted by u for school 
district o, generating an indicator of school district organizational effectiveness 𝜃𝑜. The maximization 
is subject to three constraints. First, the normality constraint (1a) imposes the organizational 
                                                     
5 Examples of DEA applications in education are widely available. For example, at the school level (Bessent & Bessent, 1980; 
Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978), at the district level (Färe, Grosskopf, & Weber, 1989; McCarty & Yaisawarng, 1993), and 
in higher education (Johnes & Johnes, 2009). An in-depth literature review on efficiency techniques in education is available 
in De Witte & López-Torres (2017).  
6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions on the matter of output transformations (Barnum, Coupet, 
Gleason, McWilliams, & Parhankangas, 2017). In the evaluation of school districts, we can reasonably assume that a decrease 
in effectiveness for one district function can be offset by a higher effectiveness for another function. School districts set 
priorities and divide their time and board members accordingly.  
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effectiveness of school districts to be equal to at most 1 for all districts in the reference set, when the 
optimal weights of district j are attached to the corresponding school district functions. Values of 𝜃𝑜=1 
denote an effective unit, while 𝜃𝑜 ≤ 1 indicates that unit o can be considered ineffective. This implies 
that organizational effectiveness scores below unity indicate that the district performs ‘worse’ since 
there exist other districts in the sample outperforming district j, even when its optimal set of weights are 
attached. Second, the non-negativity constraint (1b) requires weights to be positive (but not strictly). In 
other words, school district organizational effectiveness is a non-decreasing function of the components 
of this indicator. For example, a higher evaluation of the financial policy (one of the district functions, 
see 4.) will not lower the aggregate indicator of organizational effectiveness. Lastly, the third constraint 
reflects the assumption of variable returns to scale (1c) imposed on the data. In BoD model (1), and in 
general DEA applications, convexity is implicitly imposed. Convexity implies that points on the frontier 
used to evaluate observations can be constructed based on linear combinations of actual data points. 
This assumption is particularly strong since some combinations of observations can never be actually 
realized (Cherchye et al., 2007). Adjusting the BoD model to release the assumption of convexity results 
in the ‘Free disposal hull’ (FDH) model, developed in Deprins, Simar, & Tulkens (1984). Formally, 
FDH adds the following condition:   
    𝑢𝑖 ∈ {0,1}    (1d) 
3.2. Robust BoD  
 Due to its deterministic nature measurement errors or outliers in the data can heavily influence the 
obtained measures of school district organizational effectiveness. Therefore, we adapt (1) to the robust 
order-m approach of Cazals, Florens, & Simar (2002). This method limits the influence of outliers and 
measurement errors by repeatedly drawing (B times) samples (size m<n) from the available data set. 
This re-sampling technique computes BoD estimates for each subsample of size m and averages these 
B estimates into an indicator which is robust to the limitation of BoD as a deterministic estimator:  
    𝜃𝑜
𝑂𝑀(𝑦) =
1
𝐵
∑ 𝜃𝑜
𝑏𝐵
𝑏=1 (𝑦)   (2) 
 By drawing, with replacement, subsamples of size m, a less extreme benchmark is used, increasing 
the score attached to an evaluated unit. Note that when 𝑚 → 𝑛, the ‘robust BoD’ estimates correspond 
with those obtained using the deterministic model (Cazals et al., 2002).7 Also, since m<n, it is possible 
that an evaluated school district does not belong to the set of districts used to obtain its own score of 
organizational effectiveness. This observation will then be located above the production frontier, 
resulting in a score above unity (i.e. ‘super-effective’). The order-m indicator of school district 
organizational effectiveness is the BoD score of a school district relative to the expected maximum score 
among m randomly drawn school districts. Hence, a super-effective school district can be seen as a 
                                                     
7 Remark that as m=n, these scores do not necessarily coincide because the resampling technique is based on random sampling 
samples of size m from the main sample of size n. 
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district that is doing better than the average m other school districts in its reference sample. Depending 
on the choice of m, the proportion of super-effective observations varies since the size of the drawn 
sample (m) relative to the total sample size n influences the probability of observation o not belonging 
to the production frontier.8 In order to compute the organizational effectiveness of school districts in the 
following section, we have set m at levels in accordance with Daraio & Simar (2007). In our application, 
we use m=40.9 The number of samples (B) drawn to calculate our robust measure of organizational 
effectiveness will affect the accuracy of this measure. Therefore, B is preferably as high as possible, 
although more repetitions will require more computing power. We have set B equal to 2000 for all 
composite indicators. 
3.3. Robust and conditional BoD 
Environmental variables that are not under the control of school districts need to be taken into 
account when calculating a (robust) BoD score of organizational effectiveness. This point has been 
developed by Simar & Wilson (2007) and further stressed in Simar & Wilson (2011). Failure to include 
this set of exogenous variables (Z=𝑧1, … 𝑧𝑅) returns biased evaluations of school district organizational 
effectiveness when Z affects the attainable set (i.e. the production frontier). If the attainable set is not 
affected by Z, the ‘separability condition’ is said to hold. In the application at hand, imposing 
separability is especially stringent since it implicitly assumes that all survey respondents evaluate school 
districts relative to the same frontier. That is, the underlying, ‘true’ effectiveness levels do not depend 
on values of Z.10 Previous studies using survey data have shown that respondent characteristics do 
significantly affect the attainable set – or at least the perceived attainable set (Cordero, Salinas-Jiménez, 
& Salinas-Jiménez, 2017; Verschelde & Rogge, 2012). In addition, other environmental variables can 
be related to the frontier, such as the location of the evaluated unit (Fusco, Vidoli, & Sahoo, 2017) and 
its political environment (Kristof De Witte & Geys, 2013). In order to circumvent the restrictive 
separability condition, we choose to develop our model building on the work of Cazals et al. (2002) and 
Daraio & Simar (2005; 2006; 2007). These authors propose a method to incorporate Z into the analysis 
to obtain so-called ‘conditional’ measures. Intuitively, school districts will be evaluated relative to a 
reference group characterized by a similar environment (observations i for which 𝑧𝑖 ≈ 𝑍). We tailor the 
model in (2) to a robust and conditional Benefit-of-the-Doubt indicator:  
𝜃𝑜
𝑂𝑀(𝑦|𝑧)     (3) 
In contrast to (2), where all observations have an equal probability of belonging to the reference 
sample, the probability of being drawn for each school district depends on its vector Z when estimating 
                                                     
8 Therefore, m can be used in a dual meaning: (i) a trimming parameter to choose a specific level of robustness, and (ii) the 
number of potential competitors drawn for every subset b when evaluating unit o. 
9 The value of m is set in a way to attain a sufficiently small decrease in the proportion of super-effective school districts, see 
Figure A1 . However, adjusting m does not alter our findings (i.e. we also considered m=100).  
10 For a clear graphical illustration of this assumption, see Simar & Wilson, 2007; Figure 1, p. 207). 
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the conditional order-m BoD score. To do so, we smooth Z by estimating a kernel function around z. 
The probability of being drawn then depends on the resulting kernel density function, evaluated at Z. 
For example, school districts evaluated by young respondents are more likely to be drawn for 
membership in the reference sample (of size m) when the evaluated school district is assessed by a young 
respondent. Considering possible systematic response patterns across respondents, the concept of 
benchmarking school districts relative to districts operating in largely similar environments (in a 
conditional approach) can be argued to be preferable over imposing separability (in an unconditional 
approach), where Z is assumed to be independent of the attainable set.11 In the specific case where all 
variables in Z are continuous, the approach of Bǎdin, Daraio, & Simar (2010), based on Hall, Racine, & 
Li (2004) can be implemented. In the more general case where Z consists of both continuous and discrete 
variables, different strategies can be followed. One possibility here is to create subsamples by setting 
the bandwidth equal to zero for discrete variables. Another possibility is to apply the kernel methods 
suggested by Li & Racine (2004) in order to smooth all variables in Z, both discrete and continuous. 
This approach is adopted in De Witte & Kortelainen (2013) and has been applied in other studies 
estimating robust conditional indicators (e.g. Cordero, Alonso-Morán, Nuño-Solinis, Orueta, & Arce, 
2015; Verschelde & Rogge, 2012). More recently, Li, Simar, & Zelenyuk (2016) proposed an alternative 
procedure that allows different bandwidths for continuous variables in different subgroups and allows 
smoothing over the discrete variables (Li et al., 2016).12 
The resulting estimates are robust to outlying observations and measurement error, and account for 
systematic response patterns and heterogeneity in the educational landscape by including Z as a 
condition when estimating school district organizational effectiveness. Again, 𝜃𝑜
𝑂𝑀(𝑦|𝑧) can be larger 
than unity due to subsampling in the order-m approach. Super-effective units can now be seen as school 
districts outperforming the average m other school districts in its reference sample, operating under 
largely similar environmental conditions.  
3.4. Inference 
As an additional advantage of estimating robust conditional BoD indicators, the influence of 
variables in Z can be interpreted. The effect of Z on school district organizational effectiveness can be 
evaluated by looking at the ratio of the conditional (3) over the unconditional (2) estimate: 
    𝑄𝑜 =
?̂?𝑜
𝑂𝑀(𝑦|𝑧) 
?̂?𝑜
𝑂𝑀(𝑦) 
    (4) 
This ratio can be nonparametrically regressed on a variable in Z of interest. Graphically, the slope of the 
smoothed regression line offers an interpretation of the marginal effect of this variable on the attainable 
                                                     
11 Daraio, Simar, & Wilson (2017) provide a formal test of separability, building on Kneip, Simar, & Wilson (2016). 
12 We follow this idea by estimating separate bandwidths for continuous variables for unique combinations of discrete variables. 
For the sake of completeness, we provide in Table A5 the results obtained by using the smoothing method proposed by Li & 
Racine (2004), which is preferable in settings with many categories and small samples. Our main findings are robust to this 
alternative smoothing approach. 
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set (Daraio & Simar, 2005; 2007). In our conditional and robust BoD model – with output orientation 
and effectiveness scores between 0 and 1 (excluding super effective districts) –, a positive slope indicates 
that the variable in Z, say z, can be deemed unfavorable. That is, the frontier used to evaluate school 
districts with a high value of z will be positioned lower than the frontier constructed by the unconditional 
model. Analogously, a negative slope indicates a positive effect and a straight line indicates the absence 
of an effect. A combination of effects is also possible since the line is smoothed using a nonparametric 
regression.13 It is possible to test the statistical significance of these effects. In order to obtain 
significance levels, we follow the nonparametric bootstrap approach by Li & Racine (2007). As noted 
before, an alternative approach would be to regress unconditional effectiveness scores on explanatory 
variables, assuming separability holds (i.e. ‘two-stage approach’). In section 5 we formally reject the 
validity of this assumption to motivate a conditional rather than a two-stage approach. This is 
particularly relevant here due to possible systematic response patterns when using survey data (see 
before). In the same vein, we can include explanatory variables of interest in the conditional estimates 
in order to mimic second-stage regressions, without the need to impose separability. Variables can be 
gradually added by extending Z when estimating the conditional scores. In section 5 we regress the ratio, 
𝑄, on variables in our dataset to identify determinants of organizational effectiveness.  
4. Education system and data 
4.1. The organization of school districts in Flanders 
This paper analyzes the organizational effectiveness of school districts in Flanders, the northern part 
of Belgium. The region of Flanders makes an interesting application as school districts are not organized 
based on geographical criteria or catchment areas. Schools organize themselves in school districts, 
governed by school boards, which are responsible for the financial state, HR-policy, strategy, etc. of 
their school(s) (see again Figure 1). In practice, school districts are not necessarily in charge of these 
responsibilities and often leave the decision making to the schools themselves. Some districts act as a 
financial supervisor while others are actively involved in the pedagogical and HR policies of their 
schools.  
Correspondences between the Flemish educational system and other countries are significant as, in 
line with many other OECD countries like the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy, it is 
marked by a recent trend towards decentralization (e.g. Burns & Köster, 2016). School districts in 
Flanders have full autonomy over the scale of their operations. Nevertheless, financial incentives are 
provided by the government to encourage larger scale joint structures. ‘School communities’ are the 
most common form of cooperation. Communities of schools are formed on a voluntary basis, yet this 
organizational form is encouraged by the Flemish government.14 Consolidated school districts have a 
                                                     
13 See for example, Daraio & Simar (2006, p.532). 
14 School districts belonging to different types of providers are allowed to cooperate, although most school communities remain 
provider-specific. 
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structure where different districts are merged into one, led by a unified school board in charge of 
different schools. Some school districts choose not to consolidate nor cooperate and hence do not have 
a joint structure. 
While not all schools are organized by the government, all Flemish schools are publicly subsidized. 
The subsidy is granted to the school district, which oversees the distribution of subsidies to its schools. 
As some schools are organized by the government, we observe both government and non-government 
districts. The former consists of community, local and central government institutions while private 
education providers make up the latter. In sum, we observe a heterogeneous educational landscape, 
ranging from very small one-unit school districts to large, professionally run, school districts. In the 
following sections we will exploit this variety in organizational structures to obtain the drivers of school 
district organizational effectiveness.  
4.2. Data 
The data used in this study consists of a combination of survey data and administrative data on 
school and school district characteristics. Survey data was obtained by sending out comprehensive 
surveys to school principals, board members and presidents of all school districts in Flanders. In an 
earlier stage of this research, a qualitative analysis suggested that respondents indicate four functions as 
the major responsibilities of a school district: pedagogics, human resources (HR), financial policy, and 
investments & infrastructure.15 The survey subsequently sent out to principals and school board 
members across Flanders was designed in such a way to cover these district functions. The questionnaire 
comprised 272 items, including questions with respect to respondent characteristics, variables identified 
as essential in the literature (Devos et al., 1999; Vanhoof et al., 2012), and a set of (five-point) Likert 
questionnaire items dealing with each district function.16 The number of respondents equals 150, 
consisting of 98 school principals and 52 school board members. The response rate reaches almost 30% 
and is particularly high because all surveys were sent out with the support of education providers in 
Flanders. The self-collected survey data are matched to administrative data (covering all districts) 
provided by the Flemish Ministry of Education. All data corresponds to the year 2012.  
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. For some school districts we use evaluations of school 
board members (at the district level) and for others we use data from school principals. In our dataset, it 
does not occur that multiple types of respondents can be identified with one school district.17 In essence, 
we assume school principals to be able to evaluate the school district supervising their schools. By 
                                                     
15 In-depth interviews were conducted in an earlier stage of this research with 90 members of school boards, which are covering 
955 schools. The interviewees were selected to optimally represent the diverse educational landscape in Flanders. 
16 Throughout this paper, the assumption is made that Likert type items are not problematic to obtain a measure of effectiveness, 
as in Verschelde & Rogge (2012). As suggested by one referee, extending the conditional BoD to accommodate discrete and 
bounded data (Chen, Cook, Du, Hu, & Zhu, 2017) can be a promising avenue for future research. 
17 Note that the organizational effectiveness of every school district is evaluated by a single respondent as, to obtain reliable 
insights, we invited only high-level respondents that are familiar with these matters. These are either school board members or 
school principals. The former group consists of only 8 people per district, while the latter is at most one if there is one school 
in a district. Hence, the number of respondents per district is low by construction. 
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including respondent characteristics in our conditional estimates, we also account for the type of 
evaluator when comparing school districts. Hence, if systematic response patterns exist between groups, 
then we account for this using conditional models. As a result, we are able to evaluate school districts 
using opinions of school board members and school principals. 
From Table 1, we can see that most respondents are female, respectively 66 and 71 percent for 
principals and members of the school board. Board members also tend to be older, especially in the 
oldest age groups. Almost 14 percent are above the age of 61, compared to 0 percent for school 
principals. The age variable is aggregated as a dummy indicating whether the respondent has an age 
below 50 years. More than half of the respondents (54%) holds a Master’s degree or above (e.g. PhD). 
This number is inflated by almost all board members holding a ‘high’ degree. School board members 
are mostly retired and/or volunteers, although one in four is also considered a civil servant. This is partly 
due to board members taking up a political mandate. Remarkably, political mandates appear more 
frequently among school principals compared to school board members. Some board members (17 
percent) are still active, either as employees or self-employed, whereas the majority is considered 
‘inactive’ by official statistics.  
In addition to respondent characteristics, we also include variables suggested in the existing 
literature to be of importance. The set of variables includes the structure of the organization, socio-
economic environment, management style, and school board composition (expertise). This allows us to 
explain differences in school district organizational effectiveness, and determine which variables can be 
identified as decisive. Table 1 indicates that most of the districts in our sample (80.1%) are subsidized, 
but not organized, by the government. Other districts (19.9%) can be organized by community, local, or 
central governments. Apart from the type of organizer, districts can differ in their organizational 
structure. We disentangle three organizational structures (see section 2.1.): no joint structure (2.65% of 
the sample), community (88.08%), and consolidation (9.27%). As expected, most school districts belong 
to a school community as participation is strongly encouraged by the Flemish government.  
 School districts in our sample consist of almost 6 schools on average, ranging from 1 to 59 schools 
per district. An average school district employs almost 280 full time equivalents (FTE) and less than 
half at the median. As illustrated by these two variables, there is a large variation in size in our sample.18 
To mitigate possible bias from this strong variation, we follow Groenez et al. (2015) to group our sample 
in either small or large districts. The chosen cutoff value is identical to theirs and set at 6 schools per 
district. This dummy variable indicates that 22.5% and 77.5% of Flemish school districts can be 
considered as large and small, respectively. The percentage of tenured personnel reflects the share of 
FTE at the district level registered as tenured, amounting to 72% on average. The variables ‘GON 
resources’ and ‘Maternal education’ are included in our analysis to account for differences in student 
                                                     
18 Table A1 shows that variation in the full population is also high when size-related variables are considered. This 
heterogeneity in size and, hence, organizational structure is a specific characteristic of the Flemish educational landscape and 
supports our choice of Flanders for the study of school districts. 
13 
composition between districts. On average, slightly above 1 percent of the students in our sampled 
districts is eligible for additional funding to support integration of special needs students (GON). One 
in sixteen mothers (0.0625) of students in our sample attained a high school diploma as their highest 
degree. Both indicators vary strongly across districts, within a range of [0-0.06] and [0-0.292], 
respectively. 
In line with Hoffman (1995), we include an indicator of management style to capture the type of 
collaboration between school principals and the school district (see again Figure 1). A participative 
management style is a type of management in which stakeholders at all levels in Figure 1 are encouraged 
to get involved in decision making. This style corresponds to a ‘bottom-up approach’. Supportive 
management by school districts leaves all major decisions to lower levels of the organization (i.e. school 
principals). In supportive school districts, schools operate as autonomous entities with only limited 
coordination between them. School districts adopting a centralized management style are the opposite 
of participative districts, by centralizing the decision-making process. All processes run top-down, and 
schools retain only limited autonomy. We create a dummy variable by counting the number of district 
functions that is considered ‘participative’, ‘supportive’ or ‘centralized’ by the respondent and set the 
dummy equal to one if the majority of district functions follows a participative style. By construction, 
the other management styles cannot be the majority, and make up the counterfactual. This allows us to 
check the claim by Hoffman (1995), who defines effective school boards (districts) as “school boards 
that involve school team and parents in their decision-making process”. Table 1 indicates that around 
one in five school districts adheres to a participative management style for the majority of their 
functions. A final variable is the available expertise in the evaluated school districts. It is measured as 
the number of district functions where expertise is available. 
Table A3 in the Appendix compares mean values of variables from the administrative dataset for 
the entire population of schools and school districts (Table A1) and for the sample of our analysis (Table 
A2). The last column of Table A3 displays t-statistics and only indicates significant differences (at the 
1% level) for both size variables, i.e. schools per district and FTE per district. The sample mean is 
skewed by the largest district containing 59 schools. This explains the discrepancy between sample mean 
(5.7) and population mean (3.3). We account for this skewed distribution by recoding the size variable 
(see above). Maternal education is slightly higher in the population, but this difference is negligible. 
Other variables do not differ significantly, confirming the representativeness of our sample.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Respondent characteristics and explanatory variables. 
Variables N=150a 
Respondent Characteristics Yes No 
Gender (Male = yes) 32.45% 67.55% 
Age (< 50 years old = yes) 33.11% 66.89% 
Education: Master’s or above 54.30% 45.70% 
Political Mandate 5.96% 94.04% 
Board Member 34.44% 65.56% 
Statusb: Active 17.00% 83.00% 
 Civil servant 25.00% 75.00% 
 Retiree 46.00% 54.00% 
 Volunteer 12.00% 88.00% 
Explanatory variables Yes No 
Non-government board 80.13% 19.87% 
More than 6 locations  22.52% 77.48% 
Participative Managementc 21.19% 78.81% 
Structure No joint structure      2.65% 97.35 
 Community 88.08% 11.92% 
 Consolidation 9.27% 90.77% 
 Mean SD Median Min Max 
Participative Managementd  3.94 2.684 3.00 0.00 10.00 
Expertise 3.89 1.376 4.00 1.00 7.00 
Schools per district 5.74 9.109 3.00 1.00 59.00 
FTE per district 278.40 485.80 123.90 4.50 3213.00 
% tenurede  0.72 0.056 0.717 0.514 0.85 
GON resourcesf 0.011 0.0080 0.010 0.00 0.06 
Maternal educationg 0.063 0.051 0.048 0.00 0.29 
Table 2: Scores per function and organizational effectiveness of school districts. 
Note: Summary statistics are presented in histograms in Figure A2 and A3 in the Online Appendix. 
Functions N Mean SD Median Min Max u 
Human Resources 150 0.805 0.164 0.813 0.303 1.064 0.056 
Financial policy 150 0.924 0.113 1 0.401 1.037 0.826 
Investment & Infrastructure 150 0.813 0.167 0.800 0.100 1.047 0.110 
Pedagogics 150 0.828 0.208 0.903 0.200 1.129 0.039 
Organizational effectiveness        
Unconditional 150 0.942 0.087 0.996 0.603 1.066  
Conditional 1 150 0.968 0.060 1.000 0.636 1.002  
Conditional 5 150 0.980 0.051 1.000 0.651 1.000  
a. To maintain an equal number of observations throughout our analysis, we applied the multiple imputation technique.  
b. Status of respondents are only listed for board members. All principals are listed as civil servants. Respondents were 
allowed to select multiple statuses; e.g. most retirees are also volunteers.  
c. The first variable ‘Participative management’ is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of district functions is 
organized in a ‘participative manner’.  
d. This variable is discrete and simply counts the number of functions where the district’s management style is considered 
participative. e. This variable indicates the percentage of full-time equivalents (FTE) registered as tenured personnel.  
f. The Flemish funding mechanism provides additional funding for special needs students. This variable captures the share 
of eligible students in a school district.  
g. Maternal education indicates the share of students in each district whose mother only obtained a high school degree or 
below. 
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5. Results 
Table 2 displays the scores for every function, obtained by aggregating the questionnaire items in Table 
A4 (i.e. HR (6), financial policy (4), investment & infrastructure (3), and pedagogics (4)).19 Aggregation 
is done by applying model (2) for each function separately. Next, we obtain an unconditional composite 
indicator of organizational effectiveness by considering the previously computed district function scores 
as output variables in (2). Motivation to follow this aggregation procedure in two steps is twofold. First, 
it is consistent with our reasoning to abstain from imposing subjective weights, outlined in the 
introduction and methodology sections. Alternative approaches to reduce dimensions such as taking 
averages, or to perform PCA (Bădin, Daraio, & Simar, 2012) would not follow this reasoning. Second, 
including all 17 items in the assessment would decrease the discriminatory power of the model (Dyson 
et al., 2001), especially when applying (3).20  Also, in the application at hand, it is interesting to consider 
the importance of each district function with respect to the overall score of organizational effectiveness. 
This issue is related to the r endogenously attached weights, u. These weights are also called ‘shadow 
prices’ in the literature and we derive them by regressing the overall score on all four components. 
Running the regression without an intercept returns coefficients which add up to one. The resulting 
shadow prices are listed in the final column of Table 2. Clearly, the financial policy of school districts 
is a major driver of organizational effectiveness (0.83). Investment & infrastructure also contributes to 
effectiveness (0.11) while both HR and pedagogics are of rather limited importance, with a combined 
weight equal to 0.09.  
The overall (unconditional) measure of organizational effectiveness equals 0.941 on average. This 
number can be interpreted as follows: if all school districts would perform as well as the districts in their 
reference set, school districts would be able to improve their organizational effectiveness by almost 6% 
on average. Moreover, the worst performing district should be able to increase its organizational 
effectiveness by almost 40 percent. This large discrepancy in organizational effectiveness might be due 
school districts being compared to a frontier which they cannot reach. In other words, unconditional 
models impose that the attainable set is not dependent on Z. When survey data is used, this assumption 
is unlikely to hold since the perceived frontier might be different depending on the evaluator. Evaluated 
units cannot change who is evaluating their effectiveness and hence, respondent characteristics can be 
considered exogenous. Applying the test of Daraio et al. (2017), we formally check whether these 
exogenous respondent characteristics meet the separability condition and firmly reject it for all 
                                                     
19 The internal consistency of these items is discussed in Online Appendix A1. 
20 We also asked respondents to evaluate every district function on a scale of 1 to 10. Using these evaluations, we can compare 
the composite indicators for every function (2) with our single-item scale to evaluate the consistency of the district function 
scores. Depending on the chosen district function, both Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients attain values between 
0.4 and 0.7, as displayed in Figure A4. As we motivated in section 3, a multi-item evaluation allows school districts autonomy 
in setting priorities, which is not the case in the single-item scale. This supports our choice to obtain composite indicators for 
all district functions. 
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respondent characteristics.21 Including differences in perceptions (systematic response patterns related 
to respondent characteristics) can be considered a necessary requirement when using survey data to 
benchmark school districts (or other entities). Therefore, we estimate (3) to obtain a robust, and 
conditional measure of organizational effectiveness of school districts.  
Once we allow a fair comparison of school districts by including respondent and school district 
environment characteristics (Conditional 1, Table 2), the average score increases (0.966) while the 
standard deviation decreases (0.065). This is intuitive, considering that we now benchmark school 
districts relative to districts operating in largely similar environments. Nevertheless, the lowest 
performing school district can still improve its organizational effectiveness by 37%, despite being 
compared to similar school districts. We gradually extend the conditional model by including variables 
related to the organization of school districts, identified as essential in the literature. This results in 4 
additional conditional estimates. 
To assess the impact of the variables in Z on the organizational effectiveness of school districts, we 
regress the ratio of unconditional scores over conditional scores (Q) on Z. Regression results are 
displayed in Table 3. We estimated 5 nonparametric regressions, one for each conditional estimate. All 
models estimated here control for respondent characteristics and school district environment – i.e. these 
variables are included in Z. From Table 3, we can see that board members, male and young respondents 
are generally more unfavorable in their evaluation of school districts. Other respondent and district 
environment characteristics are alternatingly or non-significant once organizational variables are 
included.  
In the bottom panel of Table 3, we can see that all variables related to the organization of school districts 
are considered ‘favorable’. This is consistent with the literature since we selected variables identified in 
previous studies as being crucial for the organizational effectiveness of school districts. From models 1 
to 5, we find that private school districts significantly outperform public school districts in terms of 
organizational effectiveness. In models 4 and 5, we find that district size (>6 schools per district) has a 
significantly favorable effect on organizational effectiveness. Also, consolidated districts are evaluated 
significantly favorable, while the difference for districts without a joint structure is not significant. A 
participative management style adhered by the school district also results in a favorable evaluation of 
the districts, as well as more experienced board members, although only the latter relationship is found 
to be significant – unlike in Table A5 where both variables are significant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
21 We follow the approach of splitting the sample into subgroups for discrete variables (respondent characteristics here), 
outlined in Daraio et al. (2017, Appendix C, p.4) and Kneip et al. (2016, p 437-439). We apply the deterministic rule for sample 
splitting provided by Daraio et al. (2017, Appendix C, p.5-6). p-values for respondent characteristics are all well below 0.001. 
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Table 3: Statistical inference of school district organizational effectiveness. 
Note: p-values in bold indicate significance at least at the 10% level. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper introduced an innovative approach to measure and explain school district organizational 
effectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, there is no well-established evaluation methodology to 
compare the effectiveness of school districts that have multiple tasks and are operating in a 
heterogeneous environment. Therefore, we provide a framework to benchmark school districts and 
obtain a measure of organizational effectiveness. We tailored the Benefit-of-the-Doubt model to a 
robust, conditional composite indicator. Our approach is robust for outlying observations (or 
measurement error) and fully nonparametric. As a result, no weights need to be imposed on district 
functions, which allows school districts sufficient leeway in setting their priorities. This can be 
considered to be of major relevance for the education sector where decentralization and autonomy are 
becoming increasingly important (Burns & Köster, 2016; Woessmann, Lüdemann, Schütz, & West, 
2007). Also, school districts are compared to a frontier composed of the most effective districts, 
constructed in a way that environmental factors, outside the influence of school districts, are taken into 
account. In this paper, we use survey data and illustrate the importance of conditioning on respondent 
characteristics. Our measure of organizational effectiveness can be seen as ‘perceived’ effectiveness. 
Hence, the perceived frontier might be different depending on the evaluator. Evaluated units cannot 
change who is evaluating their effectiveness and hence, respondent characteristics can be considered 
exogenous. In our application, school districts were evaluated in a significantly unfavorable way by 
male and young respondents, and board members, after rejecting the separability condition for all 
N=150 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value 
School district environment           
Maternal education unfavorable 0.890 unfavorable 0.470 unfavorable 0.399 unfavorable 0.943 unfavorable 0.009 
GON resources favorable 0.349 favorable 0.107 favorable 0.329 favorable 0.723 favorable 0.903 
% tenured unfavorable 0.079 favorable 0.463 unfavorable 0.916 unfavorable 0.339 unfavorable 0.675 
Respondent characteristics           
Gender (male=yes) unfavorable 0.004 unfavorable 0.313 unfavorable 0.504 unfavorable 0.104 unfavorable 0.000 
Age (<50 years old = yes) unfavorable 0.013 unfavorable 0.132 unfavorable 0.031 unfavorable 0.338 unfavorable 0.000 
Education: Master's or above unfavorable 0.202 favorable 0.001 favorable 0.002 favorable 0.013 unfavorable 0.000 
Board member unfavorable 0.118 unfavorable 0.007 unfavorable 0.007 unfavorable 0.015 unfavorable 0.007 
Organization           
More than 6 schools favorable 0.580 favorable 0.305 favorable 0.432 favorable 0.005 favorable 0.001 
Private school district   favorable 0.290 unfavorable 0.177 favorable 0.051 favorable 0.032 
Participative management     favorable 0.379 favorable 0.556 favorable 0.512 
Consolidation       favorable 0.000 favorable 0.000 
No joint       favorable 0.415 favorable 0.352 
Expertise         favorable 0.052 
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respondent characteristics. Including variables related to the organization of school districts reveals that 
school districts adhering to a participative management style and districts with more experienced board 
members outperform other districts in terms of organizational effectiveness. Also, private school 
districts achieve significantly higher levels of organizational effectiveness, along with larger districts 
and districts that follow a consolidated rather than a cooperative organizational structure.  
It is important to ask to what degree the results in this paper can be generalized to other settings and 
there are certainly a number of caveats worth noting. First, we do not claim to present causal evidence, 
but we offer a contribution in terms of an empirical framework to benchmark school districts. Future 
research might expand the selection of environmental variables, consider multiple time periods or 
exploit exogenous shocks in school district policies. Second, in our dataset it does not occur that multiple 
respondents can be identified with one school district. If this would be the case, different respondents 
should again be weighted to obtain a score for each school district. Internal heterogeneity in assessing 
the organizational effectiveness of school districts and corresponding weighting procedures will have to 
receive further attention. Third, despite similarities between the education system in Flanders and other 
OECD countries, outlined in section 2, results cannot be simply extrapolated to other countries. 
However, the framework proposed here can serve as a starting point for further research. Considering 
the ability of conditional models to account for the exogenous environment, the methodology can be 
easily extended to other educational systems.  
Policy implications can be deduced from our findings to improve the organizational effectiveness 
of school districts. School board members should be recruited based on experience. Also, investments 
in management training to improve cooperation between principals (at the school level) and board 
members (at the district level) will likely result in higher organizational effectiveness. There is a 
tendency to increase professionalism by enlarging the scale of operations in public sector entities 
(Alonso, Clifton, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2015). Our findings suggest possible benefits from increasing the 
scale of school districts, although policy makers should consider the organizational structure when 
pursuing this – i.e. through consolidation rather than cooperation. Finally, considering the persistent 
differences between public and private school districts, mediocre public districts can boost their 
organizational effectiveness significantly by implementing ‘best practices’ observed in the private 
sector. Once again, this illustrates the importance of benchmarking between school districts. Our 
approach aimed to provide a method to do so and, in so doing, strengthen the support schools, principals 
and ultimately students receive from their school districts.  
References 
 
Adolphson, D. L., Cornia, G. C., & Walters, L. C. (1991). A Unified Framework for Classifying DEA Models. 
Operational Research ’90, 647–657. 
Alonso, J. M., Clifton, J., & Díaz-Fuentes, D. (2015). Did New Public Management Matter? An empirical 
analysis of the outsourcing and decentralization effects on public sector size. Public Management Review, 
17(5), 643–660. 
19 
Alsbury, T. L. (2008). School Board Member and Superintendent Turnover and the Influence on Student 
Achievement: An Application of the Dissatisfaction Theory. Leadership and Policy in Schools, 7(2), 202–
229. 
Andrews, M., Duncombe, W., & Yinger, J. (2002). Revisiting economies of size in American education: are we 
any closer to a consensus? Economics of Education Review, 21(3), 245–262. 
Bădin, L., Daraio, C., & Simar, L. (2012). How to measure the impact of environmental factors in a 
nonparametric production model. European Journal of Operational Research, 223(3), 818–833. 
Bǎdin, L., Daraio, C., & Simar, L. (2010). Optimal bandwidth selection for conditional efficiency measures: A 
data-driven approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 201(2), 633–640. 
Ball, S. (2011). Evaluating Educational Programs. ETS Scientific and Policy Contributions Series, ETS SPC–
11(April). 
Barnum, D., Coupet, J., Gleason, J., McWilliams, A., & Parhankangas, A. (2017). Impact of input substitution 
and output transformation on data envelopment analysis decisions. Applied Economics, 49(15), 1543–
1556. 
Bartusek, L. (2000). IASB’s Lighthouse Study: School boards and student achievement. Iowa School Board 
Compass, 5(2), 1–12. 
Bessent,  a. M., & Bessent, E. W. (1980). Determining the Comparative Efficiency of Schools through Data 
Envelopment Analysis. Educational Administration Quarterly, 16(2), 57–75. 
Bidwell, C. E., & Kasarda, J. D. (1975). School District Organization and Student Achievement. American 
Sociological Review, 40(1), 55–70. 
Bloom, N., Lemos, R., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2015). Does Management Matter in schools? The 
Economic Journal, 125(584), 647–674. 
Bradshaw, P., Murray, V., & Wolpin, J. (1992). Do Nonprofit Boards Make a Difference? An Exploration of the 
Relationships Among Board Structure, Process, and Effectiveness. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 21(3), 227–249. 
Burns, T., & Köster, F. (2016). Governing Education in a Complex World. OECD Publishing. 
Caenepeel, L. (1988). Scholen besturen: samenstelling, structuur en functioneren van inrichtende machten van 
katholieke scholen. Acco. 
Cazals, C., Florens, J.-P., & Simar, L. (2002). Nonparametric frontier estimation: a robust approach. Journal of 
Econometrics, 106(1), 1–25. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., & Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making units. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 2(6), 429–444. 
Chen, Y., Cook, W. D., Du, J., Hu, H., & Zhu, J. (2017). Bounded and discrete data and Likert scales in data 
envelopment analysis: application to regional energy efficiency in China. Annals of Operations Research, 
347–366. 
Cherchye, L., Moesen, W., Rogge, N., & Puyenbroeck, T. Van. (2007). An introduction to “benefit of the doubt” 
composite indicators. Social Indicators Research, 82(1), 111–145. 
Cordero, J. M., Alonso-Morán, E., Nuño-Solinis, R., Orueta, J. F., & Arce, R. S. (2015). Efficiency assessment 
of primary care providers: A conditional nonparametric approach. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 240(1), 235–244. 
Cordero, J. M., Salinas-Jiménez, J., & Salinas-Jiménez, M. M. (2017). Exploring factors affecting the level of 
happiness across countries: A conditional robust nonparametric frontier analysis. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 256(2), 663–672. 
Cornforth, C. (2001). What Makes Boards Effective? An examination of the relationships between board inputs, 
structures, processes and effectiveness in non-profit organisations. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 9(3), 217–227. 
Cortina, J. M. (1993). What is coefficient alpha? An examination of theory and applications. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 78(1), 98–104. 
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16(3), 297–334. 
Daraio, C., & Simar, L. (2005). Introducing environmental variables in nonparametric frontier models: A 
probabilistic approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 24(1), 93–121. 
Daraio, C., & Simar, L. (2006). A robust nonparametric approach to evaluate and explain the performance of 
mutual funds. European Journal of Operational Research, 175(1), 516–542. 
Daraio, C., & Simar, L. (2007). Conditional nonparametric frontier models for convex and nonconvex 
technologies: a unifying approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 28(1), 13–32. 
Daraio, C., Simar, L., & Wilson, P. W. (2017). Central limit theorems for conditional efficiency measures and 
tests of the “separability” condition in nonparametric, two-stage models of production. The Econometrics 
Journal, forthcoming. 
De Witte, K., & Geys, B. (2013). Citizen coproduction and efficient public good provision: Theory and evidence 
from local public libraries. European Journal of Operational Research, 224(3), 592–602. 
20 
De Witte, K., & Kortelainen, M. (2013). What explains the performance of students in a heterogeneous 
environment? Conditional efficiency estimation with continuous and discrete environmental variables. 
Applied Economics, 45(17), 2401–2412. 
De Witte, K., & López-Torres, L. (2017). Efficiency in education: a review of literature and a way forward. 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 68(4), 339–363. 
Delagardelle, M. L. (2008). The lighthouse inquiry: Examining the role of school board leadership in the 
improvement of student achievement. The Future of School Board Governance: Relevancy and Revelation, 
191–224. 
Deprins, D., Simar, L., & Tulkens, H. (1984). Measuring labor inefficiency in post offices. The Performance of 
Public Enterprises: Concepts and measurements. M. Marchand, P. Pestieau and H. Tulkens (eds.). North-
Holland, Amsterdam. 
Devos, G. (2008). Professionalisering van schoolbesturen: hefbomen voor een sterke bestuurskracht. In 
Personeel en organisatie. Schoolleiding en begeleiding 2 (Vol. 19, pp. 1–22). Plantyn. 
Devos, G., Verhoeven, J. C., Beuselinck, I., den Broeck, H., Vandenberghe, R., Van den Broeck, H., & 
Vandenberghe, R. (1999). De rol van schoolbesturen in het schoolmanagement. Garant. 
Di Liberto, A., Schivardi, F., & Sulis, G. (2015). Managerial practices and student performance. Economic 
Policy, 30(84), 683–728. 
Dyson, R. G., Allen, R., Camanho, A. S., Podinovski, V. V., Sarrico, C. S., & Shale, E. A. (2001). Pitfalls and 
protocols in DEA. European Journal of Operational Research, 132(2), 245–259. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., & Weber, W. L. (1989). Measuring school district performance. Public Finance Review, 
17(4), 409–428. 
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series 
A (General), 120(3), 253–290. 
Ford, M. R., & Ihrke, D. M. (2016). Do School Board Governance Best Practices Improve District Performance? 
Testing the Key Work of School Boards in Wisconsin. International Journal of Public Administration, 
34(2), 87–94. 
Fusco, E., Vidoli, F., & Sahoo, B. K. (2017). Spatial heterogeneity in composite indicator: A methodological 
proposal. Omega, 1–14. 
García-Romero, A., Santín, D., & Sicilia, G. (2016). Another brick in the wall: a new ranking of academic 
journals in Economics using FDH. Scientometrics, 107(1), 91–101. 
Gemberling, K. W., Smith, C. W., & Villani, J. S. (2000). The key work of school boards guidebook. National 
School Boards Assoc. 
Gritz, R. M., & Theobald, N. D. (1996). The Effects of School District Spending Priorities on Length of Stay in 
Teaching. Journal of Human Resources, 31(3), 477–512. 
Groenez, S., Juchtmans, G., Smet, M., & Stevens, C. (2015). Analyse van het nieuwe financieringsmechanisme 
voor de werkingsmiddelen van scholen. Evaluatie van het financieringsdecreet van 2008: Eindrapport. 
Hall, P., Racine, J., & Li, Q. (2004). Cross-Validation and the Estimation of Conditional Probability Densities. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 99(468), 1015–1026. 
Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. (1998). Nonprofit organizational effectiveness: Contrasts between especially 
effective and less effective organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 9(1), 23–38. 
Hoffman, R. H. (1995). Contextual influences on school effectiveness: The role of school boards. School 
Effectiveness and School Improvement, 6(4), 308–331. 
Jackson, S. (2003). Recent Research on Team and Organizational Diversity: SWOT Analysis and Implications. 
Journal of Management, 29(6), 801–830. 
Jarl, M., Fredriksson, A., & Persson, S. (2012). New Public Management in Public Education: a Catalyst for the 
Professionalization of Swedish School Principals. Public Administration, 90(2), 429–444. 
Johnes, G., & Johnes, J. (2009). Higher education institutions’ costs and efficiency: Taking the decomposition a 
further step. Economics of Education Review, 28(1), 107–113. 
Johnes, J. (2006). Data envelopment analysis and its application to the measurement of efficiency in higher 
education. Economics of Education Review, 25(3), 273–288. 
Johnson, P. A. (2012). School Board Governance: The Times They Are A-Changin’. Journal of Cases in 
Educational Leadership, 15(2), 83–102. 
Kaufman, R. A., & Herman, J. J. (1991). Strategic planning in education: Rethinking, restructuring, revitalizing. 
Technomic Pub Co. 
Kneip, A., Simar, L., & Wilson, P. W. (2016). Testing Hypotheses in Nonparametric Models of Production. 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 34(3), 435–456. 
Land, D. (2002). Local School Boards Under Review: Their Role and Effectiveness in Relation to Students’ 
Academic Achievement. Review of Educational Research, 72(2), 229–278. 
Leach, J., Payne, A., & Chan, S. (2010). The effects of school board consolidation and financing on student 
performance. Economics of Education Review, 29(6), 1034–1046. 
21 
Lee, V. E., & Burkam, D. T. (2003). Dropping Out of High School: The Role of School Organization and 
Structure. American Educational Research Journal, 40(2), 353–393. 
Li, D., Simar, L., & Zelenyuk, V. (2016). Generalized nonparametric smoothing with mixed discrete and 
continuous data. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 100, 424–444. 
Li, Q., & Racine, J. (2004). Cross-Validated Local Linear Nonparametric Regression. Statistica Sinica, 16, 485–
512. 
Li, Q., & Racine, J. (2007). Nonparametric Econometrics: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press. 
Li, S. K., & Zhao, L. (2015). The competitiveness and development strategies of provinces in China: a data 
envelopment analysis approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 44(3), 293–307. 
Lovell, C. A. K., & Pastor, J. T. (1999). Radial DEA models without inputs or without outputs. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 118(1), 46–51. 
McCarty, T. A., & Yaisawarng, S. (1993). Technical efficiency in New Jersey school districts. The Measurement 
of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications, 271–287. 
McDonald, R. P. (1981). The dimensionality of tests and items. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical 
Psychology, 34(1), 100–117. 
Melyn, W., & Moesen, W. (1991). Towards a synthetic indicator of macroeconomic performance: Unequal 
weighting when limited information is available. Center for Economic Studies, KU Leuven, 17. 
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). The assessment of reliability. Psychometric Theory, 3, 248–292. 
OECD. (2008). Handbook on constructing composite indicators: Methodology and User guide. Paris. 
Rose, H., & Sonstelie, J. (2010). School board politics, school district size, and the bargaining power of teachers’ 
unions. Journal of Urban Economics, 67(3), 438–450. 
Saatcioglu, A., Moore, S., Sargut, G., & Bajaj, A. (2011). The Role of School Board Social Capital in District 
Governance: Effects on Financial and Academic Outcomes. Leadership and Policy in Schools, 10(1), 1–
42. 
Shwartz, M., Burgess, J. F., & Zhu, J. (2016). A DEA based composite measure of quality and its associated data 
uncertainty interval for health care provider profiling and pay-for-performance. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 253(2), 489–502. 
Simar, L., & Wilson, P. W. (2007). Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric models of production 
processes. Journal of Econometrics, 136(1), 31–64. 
Simar, L., & Wilson, P. W. (2011). Two-stage DEA : caveat emptor. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 36(2), 
205–218. 
Thompson, R. G., Singleton, F. D., Thrall, R. M., & Smith, B. A. (1986). High-Energy Physics Lab in Texas. 
Interfaces, 16(6), 35–49. 
Unnever, J. D., Kerckhoff, A. C., & Robinson, T. J. (2000). District variations in educational resources and 
student outcomes. Economics of Education Review, 19(3), 245–259. 
Ursachi, G., Horodnic, I. A., & Zait, A. (2015). How Reliable are Measurement Scales? External Factors with 
Indirect Influence on Reliability Estimators. Procedia Economics and Finance, 20(15), 679–686. 
Usdan, M., McCloud, B., Podmostko, M., & Cuban, L. (2001). Leadership for student learning: Restructuring 
school district leadership. Institute for Educational Leadership. 
Vanhoof, J., Deneire, A., & Van Petegem, P. (2012). Waar zit beleidsvoerend vermogen in (ver) scholen? 
Plantyn. 
Verschelde, M., & Rogge, N. (2012). An environment-adjusted evaluation of citizen satisfaction with local 
police effectiveness: Evidence from a conditional Data Envelopment Analysis approach. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 223(1), 214–225. 
Woessmann, L., Lüdemann, E., Schütz, G., & West, M. R. (2007). Autonomy, Choice, and the Level of Student 
Achievement: International Evidence from PISA 2003. OECD Education Working Papers, No. 13. 
Zanella, A., Camanho, A. S., & Dias, T. G. (2015). Undesirable outputs and weighting schemes in composite 
indicators based on data envelopment analysis. European Journal of Operational Research, 245(2), 517–
530. 
 
  
22 
Online Appendix 
A1. Internal consistency of the questionnaire.  
The in-depth interviews with different stakeholders (board members, board presidents and 
school principals) indicated four district functions as most decisive with respect to school district 
organizational effectiveness: Financial policy, HR, pedagogics, and investment & infrastructure. The 
questionnaire was designed in a way to cover all these functions extensively. Using factor analysis, 
subsets of these function-related questions were constructed to make sure every set corresponded to only 
one underlying factor (= district function). As a result, we obtained a multi-item scale for every district 
function22. We check the internal consistency of every district function using Cronbach’s alpha: 
𝛼 =
𝑁
𝑁 − 1
(1 −
∑ 𝑆𝑌𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑆𝑋
2 ) 
with 𝑆𝑌𝑖
2  and 𝑆𝑋
2 representing the sample variance of the total score X and the individual scores 𝑌𝑖, 
respectively. The value of 𝛼 indicates to what degree the observed variation in responses is item-specific 
(Cronbach, 1951). The value of 𝛼 is dependent on the number of items, the relation between items, and 
the number of underlying concepts (Cortina, 1993). Since we applied factor analysis to create sets of 
items for every district function, the homogeneity condition (only one underlying concept) is satisfied 
by construction. The chosen measure for each district function depends on the validity of τ-equivalence. 
Using the results of our factor-analysis, we can compare the factor loadings of different items with 
respect to the underlying factor. When all loadings are comparable in size, the assumption of τ -
equivalence is said to hold. In this case, 𝛼 can be seen as an indicator of the reliability of the 
questionnaire, i.e. the likelihood of an evaluated set of questions to result in reliable data. If the above 
condition cannot be validated by the observed factor loadings, another measure of reliability should be 
used, 𝜔 (McDonald, 1981). Depending on this assumption, either 𝛼 or 𝜔 are calculated. Overall, the 
measure of consistency (𝛼 and 𝜔) take on values between 0.58 (financial policy) and 0.67 (HR). On 
average, consistency equals 0.64 if we include all district functions used to obtain the effectiveness 
indicator. Although this level is below the range of [0.70-0.95] recommended  in the literature (Nunnally 
& Bernstein, 1994), the obtained values are nonetheless close to the proposed lower bound. Also, the 
importance of the value of 𝛼 (and 𝜔) should not be overstated because of the sensitivity of these 
indicators with respect to respondent characteristics (Ursachi, Horodnic & Zait, 2015). The crucial 
insight of the above analysis is the observation that all sets of questions represent strictly one district 
function. In other words, homogeneity is satisfied within all district functions, which is a prerequisite to 
obtain composite indicators for all functions, and eventually an indicator measuring overall school 
district organizational effectiveness. 
                                                     
22 Table A4 in the Appendix displays these four functions, and all matching items with the method of scoring. 
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A2. Tables 
Table A1: Summary statistics population 
Variables N Mean SD Median Min Max 
Schools per district 1,060 3.326 5.736 2 1 95 
FTE per district 1,060 138.5 277.6 48.35 3.200 4443 
% Tenured (district) 1,060 0.712 0.0783 0.719 0.192 0.931 
GON resources 1,060 0.00985 0.00855 0.00859 0 0.0923 
Maternal education 1,060 0.0695 0.0827 0.0459 0 0.833 
Organizational structure* No joint structure:  
4.52% 
Community: 
88.56% 
Consolidation: 
6.92% 
Note: * Communities of schools are formed by voluntary cooperation among schools. ‘Consolidation’ corresponds to a structure where one 
district is in charge of different schools. ‘No joint structure’ indicates that districts chose not to cooperate and did not become a community. 
 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics sample 
Variables N Mean SD Median Min Max 
Schools per district 151 5.742 9.109 3 1 59 
FTE per district 151 278.4 485.8 123.9 4.500 3213 
% Tenured (district) 151 0.716 0.0564 0.717 0.514 0.848 
GON resources 151 0.0108 0.00802 0.0102 0 0.0604 
Maternal education 151 0.0625 0.0511 0.0476 0 0.292 
Organizational structure No joint structure:  
2.65% 
Community:  
88.08% 
Consolidation: 9.27% 
 
 
Table A3: Comparison of sample and population means using administrative data (2012). 
Variable Sample Population t-statistic (p-value) 
Schools per district 5.742 3.326 3.2587 (0.0014)*** 
FTE per district 278.4 138.5 3.5373 (0.0005)*** 
% Tenured (district) 0.716 0.712 0.9047 (0.3671) 
GON resources 0.0108 0.00985 1.3982 (0.1641) 
Maternal education 0.0625 0.0695 -1.6741 (0.0962)* 
Structure No joint 2.65% 4.52% -1.2210 (0.2240) 
 Community 88.08% 88.56% -0.1816 (0.8561) 
 Consolidation 9.27% 6.92% 0.9930 (0.3223) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Questionnaire items per district function and corresponding scoring. 
District function Item Scoring 
Financial Policy How would you rate your school district’s financial policy? 1 (totally insufficient) – 10 (perfect) 
 Statutory provisions and duties with respect to the district’s 
financial policy are known by all board members. 
1 (fully disagree) – 5 (fully agree) 
 The degree of support schools receive from their district with 
respect to the school’s financial policy. 
1 (totally insufficient) – 5 (more than 
sufficient) 
 The distribution of resources over schools within the district is 
clear to me 
1 (fully disagree) – 5 (fully agree) 
HR How would you rate your school district’s HR policy? 1 (totally insufficient) – 10 (perfect) 
 The way the school district selects personnel (management, 
coordinating staff, policy makers). 
1 (totally insufficient) – 5 (more than 
sufficient) 
 The way the school district performs follow-up and performance 
interviews with school personnel 
1 (totally insufficient) – 5 (more than 
sufficient) 
 The school district is concerned with the welfare and wellbeing 
of personnel when innovations are implemented. 
1 (fully disagree) – 5 (fully agree) 
 The school district is aware of negative changes within its 
personnel. 
1 (fully disagree) – 5 (fully agree) 
 The school district is concerned with mentoring teachers and 
principals on the payroll of its district. 
1 (fully disagree) – 5 (fully agree) 
Pedagogics How would you rate your school district’s pedagogic policy? 1 (totally insufficient) – 10 (perfect) 
 The degree of support schools receive from their district with 
respect to students’ disciplinary files. 
1 (totally insufficient) – 5 (more than 
sufficient) 
 Follow up of education quality standards of schools by the 
district. 
1 (not applicable) – 5 (fully applicable) 
 School board members are fully aware of ongoing pedagogic 
projects in their schools. 
1 (fully disagree) – 5 (fully agree) 
Investment & 
Infrastructure 
How would you rate your school district’s procurement policy? 1 (totally insufficient) – 10 (perfect) 
 How would you rate your school district’s investment policy? 1 (totally insufficient) – 10 (perfect) 
 Other schools are involved in the signing of contracts 
(management and contractors). 
1 (not applicable) – 5 (fully applicable) 
 
Table A5: Statistical inference of school district organizational effectiveness following the procedure by Li & Racine (2004).  
Note: p-values in bold indicate significance at least at the 10% level.   
N=150 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value Influence p-value 
School district environment           
Maternal education unfavorable 0.022 unfavorable 0.112 unfavorable 0.102 unfavorable 0.047 unfavorable 0.021 
GON resources favorable 0.392 unfavorable 0.374 favorable 0.136 favorable 0.517 unfavorable 0.991 
% tenured unfavorable 0.098 unfavorable 0.047 unfavorable 0.070 unfavorable 0.508 unfavorable 0.399 
Respondent characteristics           
Gender (male=yes) unfavorable 0.017 unfavorable 0.000 unfavorable 0.012 favorable 0.012 unfavorable 0.000 
Age (<50 years old = yes) unfavorable 0.035 unfavorable 0.000 unfavorable 0.002 unfavorable 0.191 unfavorable 0.000 
Education: Master's or above unfavorable 0.108 favorable 0.007 favorable 0.024 favorable 0.003 favorable 0.086 
Board member unfavorable 0.151 unfavorable 0.094 unfavorable 0.007 unfavorable 0.633 favorable 0.427 
Organization           
More than 6 schools unfavorable 0.314 unfavorable 0.312 favorable 0.018 favorable 0.004 favorable 0.004 
Private school district   favorable 0.009 favorable 0.060 favorable 0.005 favorable 0.004 
Participative management     favorable 0.607 favorable 0.650 favorable 0.003 
Consolidation       favorable 0.004 favorable 0.167 
No joint       favorable 0.406 favorable 0.570 
Expertise         favorable 0.066 
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Figure A2. Organizational effectiveness per district function: Unconditional estimates. 
A3: Figures 
  
Note: Depending on the choice of m, the proportion of super-effective observations varies since the size of the drawn sample 
(m) with respect to the total sample size n influences the probability of observation o not belonging to the production frontier. 
The value of m is set in a way to attain a sufficiently small decrease in the proportion of super-effective school districts (here, 
m=40).  
 
 
 
  
Note: All histograms display the distribution of robust order-m BoD scores. Horizontal axis indicates the 
composite indicator of scores obtained by aggregating the scores awarded to the items listed in Table A4. 
Vertical axis indicates the fraction of the observations.  
Figure A1: Marginal decrease in percentage super-effective school districts. 
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Figure A3. Organizational effectiveness of school districts: Unconditional estimates. 
Note: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of observations attaining the effectiveness score on 
the horizontal axis. Total organizational effectiveness scores are obtained by aggregating composite 
indicators displayed in Figure A2. 
Figure A4. Correlations between single-item scales and Benefit-of-the-Doubt scores.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients attain values between 0.4 and 0.7. Hence, our robust 
BoD estimates do not perfectly coincide with the single-item scales but there appears to be a strong correlation 
between both measures. This finding reflects the advantage of our endogenous weighting approach: allowing 
more variables into our evaluation (without fixing weights ex ante) broadens our approach towards measuring 
organizational effectiveness, while the obtained scores are still in line with respondents’ perceptions. 
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